In what ways does Kim Jong-un’s conditional overture toward the United States alter the strategic calculus of regional actors and affect the efficacy of existing sanctions regimes?
Kim Jong-un's conditional offer at the Ninth Party Congress fundamentally restructures the diplomatic architecture of Northeast Asia by simultaneously demanding U.S. recognition of North Korea's nuclear status while categorically excluding South Korea from any meaningful dialogue—a dual-track approach that fractures traditional alliance coordination and exposes the institutional decay of multilateral sanctions enforcement.
At the once-in-five-years Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, Kim Jong-un articulated a position that represents a significant departure from previous diplomatic formulations. He declared that North Korea's status as a nuclear weapons state is "completely and absolutely irreversible" while simultaneously stating there was "no reason" the DPRK "cannot get on well with the U.S." if Washington respects "the present position of our state specified in the Constitution"—referring to North Korea's constitutionally enshrined nuclear statusKim Jong Un Says He Can 'Get On Well' With The U.S.—If It ... - Forbesforbes .
The framing is notable for its conditionality: Kim stressed that the prospect of dialogue "depends entirely on the attitude of the U.S. side," adding that Pyongyang is "prepared for both peaceful coexistence and permanent confrontation"Kim Jong Un joining hands with the US? Extends olive branch but ...economictimes . He explicitly demanded that Washington "abandon its absurd obsession with denuclearizing us, acknowledge reality, and seek genuine peaceful coexistence"Kim Jong Un Says He Can 'Get On Well' With The U.S.—If It ... - Forbesforbes .
This represents what analysts characterize as a "bypass strategy"—by severing rhetorical ties with Seoul, Kim denies South Korea its traditional role as diplomatic intermediary and signals that the only meaningful conversation is a direct channel between nuclear peers: Pyongyang and WashingtonThis is a calculated "Bypass Strategy." By severing all rhetorical ties with Seoul, Kim is denying South Korea its traditional role as a mediator. He is signaling that the only conversation that matters now is a direct line between nuclear peers—Pyongyang and Washington. Seoul has been demoted from partner to target. 2/3 #Diplomacy #KimJongUn #Survivor2026x .
The overture's most striking element is its asymmetric treatment of the United States and South Korea. Kim declared there is "absolutely nothing to discuss" with Seoul, describing South Korea as "the most hostile entity" and announcing that Pyongyang would "permanently exclude" the South from the category of "compatriots"North Korea Warns It Could Destroy South If Threatened, But Leaves Door Open for US Dialogue | Military.commilitary . This builds on the 2024 constitutional amendment defining South Korea as a "hostile state" for the first timeKim says North Korea could ‘get along’ with US, rebuffs closer ties with Seoul - France 24france24 .
The rejection came despite substantial concessions from South Korean President Lee Jae Myung's administration, including suspending loudspeaker broadcasts across the DMZ, shutting down NIS radio and TV broadcasts into North Korea, proposing scaled-back U.S.-South Korea military exercises, and reviewing the lifting of May 24 sanctions from 2010The story everyone missed in Kim Jong Un’s party congress speech. Kim just closed North Korea’s biggest political event in five years. He threatened South Korea’s “complete collapse.” Called Lee Jae-myung’s peace efforts “a clumsy deceptive farce.” Declared South Korea “permanently excluded from the category of brethren.” But here’s what changes the entire reading of this. Look at what Lee actually gave Kim over the past eight months: ∙Suspended loudspeaker broadcasts across the DMZ ∙Shut down NIS radio and TV broadcasts into North Korea ∙Officially apologized for drone incursions into the North ∙Proposed scaling back US-South Korea military exercises ∙Began reviewing the lifting of May 24 sanctions from 2010 ∙Considered reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex ∙Self-imposed a no-fly zone along the border ∙Visited Beijing to get China’s help restarting dialogue Lee gave concession after concession. No preconditions. No demands. Kim’s response at the highest political platform North Korea has? Not just rejection. Humiliation. At a once-in-five-years party congress, in front of 5,000 delegates, formalized into official party policy. Now here’s the part nobody is talking about. In the same speech, Kim told the United States: “If America respects our status and drops its hostile policies, there is no reason we cannot get along.” Read that again. Kim slammed the door on Seoul. Then cracked a window for Washington. This is not a rejection of diplomacy. This is a rejection of South Korea as a diplomatic actor. Kim wants to deal with Trump directly and cut Seoul out entirely. Lee’s concessions didn’t buy goodwill. They confirmed to Pyongyang that Seoul can be bypassed. Every unilateral concession Lee made without getting anything back told Kim the same thing: South Korea is not a serious counterpart Source: https://t.co/q3uGd5ApdNx . Seoul's response emphasized continued commitment to peaceful coexistence, stating the government "will continue its efforts to open a future of shared prosperity in which the two Koreas can peacefully coexist"S. Korea Affirms Commitment to Continuing Peace Efforts With ...qna .
Kim's demand for nuclear recognition directly challenges Washington's longstanding policy architecture. Secretary of State Marco Rubio indicated openness to engagement, stating "the United States is always prepared to talk to officials from any government that have information to share with us or viewpoints they want to share with the U.S."Kim Jong Un Says He Can 'Get On Well' With The U.S.—If It ... - Forbesforbes . President Trump has expressed willingness to meet Kim Jong-unJUST IN: 🇺🇸🇰🇵 President Trump says he is open to dialogue with North Korea's Kim Jong Un. https://t.co/JhTvxe9KCex , though the White House has maintained the goal of "complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula"⚡️North Korea says it rejects any attempt to deny its status as a nuclear-armed state. ⚡️The White House says Trump remains open to dialogue with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un to achieve the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. https://t.co/KVvhkP68cHx .
The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy notably omitted mention of North Korean denuclearization while placing greater onus on South Korea to deter threats from PyongyangNew US defense strategy warns of North Korean threats, omits denuclearization | NK Newsnknews . This omission, combined with Trump's scheduled April visit to China, has fueled speculation that talks could shift from denuclearization negotiations toward arms control discussionsPotential April NK-US summit looms as both sides signal opennesskoreatimes . As one expert noted, "If a meeting takes place without the denuclearization agenda being placed upfront, it would effectively present tacit recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-armed country"Potential April NK-US summit looms as both sides signal opennesskoreatimes .
The November 2025 Trump-Lee summit joint factsheet reaffirmed commitment to "complete denuclearization of the DPRK" and pledged to "work together to implement the Joint Statement of the 2018 U.S.-DPRK Singapore Summit"Joint Fact Sheet on President Donald J. Trump’s Meeting with President Lee Jae Myung – The White Housewhitehouse . However, this formal position exists in tension with Kim's explicit rejection of any negotiation over his nuclear arsenal.
The divergence between Seoul's engagement-oriented approach and the complexities of Washington's evolving posture creates structural tensions. U.S.-South Korea Freedom Shield exercises are scheduled for March 9-19, 2026, though there has been "speculation that the allies are seeking to tone down the drills to create conditions for dialogue with North Korea"US and South Korean Militaries Will Have Joint Drills in March as Tensions with North Korea Escalate | Military.commilitary .
Some analysts express concern about alliance drift. Reports indicate South Korea rejected a proposed U.S.-Japan-ROK joint air exercise, resulting in the United States and Japan conducting the drill without South Korea on February 16 and 18, 2026—exercises involving B-52 strategic bombersFrom a friend in Korea, about Lee Jae-myung’s government refusing to cooperate with the U.S. on military matters: “I am sending this because the situation inside South Korea’s national security structure has reached an extremely dangerous point. What happened this week is not a policy disagreement — it is a direct signal that the current administration is aligning itself with Beijing, even at the expense of the U.S.–ROK alliance. South Korea rejected a U.S.–Japan–ROK joint air exercise proposed by Washington. As a result, the United States and Japan conducted the drill without South Korea on February 16 and 18. This exercise was not symbolic. It involved four B-52 strategic bombers — core assets in America’s Indo-Pacific deterrence posture. Then the situation escalated: 1. On Feb 18, B-52s flew through the East China Sea toward the Yellow Sea. China scrambled fighter jets. 2. U.S. and Chinese aircraft confronted each other — one of the most serious air-to-air encounters in recent years. 3. And during this confrontation, the South Korean government did not support the United States. Instead, the Defense Minister and Joint Chiefs Chairman called the U.S. commander to protest. This has never happened in the history of the alliance. South Korea refused to join the exercise, China sent fighters against U.S. aircraft, and Seoul responded by complaining to Washington, not Beijing. This is not neutrality. This is alignment. According to the report, Washington is now openly concerned that: • the South Korean leadership does not wish to act as a U.S. partner in the First Island Chain • its ‘strategic autonomy’ language mirrors Beijing’s preferred framing • the government wants to restore the 9.19 military restrictions — a move that weakens surveillance, joint drills, and deterrence against China and North Korea In short: The current administration is creating distance from the United States while China, Russia, and North Korea are acting as a unified bloc. This is the clearest evidence so far that South Korea’s ruling government is pivoting toward Beijing’s sphere of influence. Given the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula — and its central role in the First Island Chain — this shift directly undermines U.S. deterrence in the region. I believe this is an urgent matter that the American strategic community must recognize. Source: https://t.co/rRzXJvq981”x . During a subsequent air encounter with Chinese fighters in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea, the South Korean government reportedly "did not support the United States" and instead "the Defense Minister and Joint Chiefs Chairman called the U.S. commander to protest"From a friend in Korea, about Lee Jae-myung’s government refusing to cooperate with the U.S. on military matters: “I am sending this because the situation inside South Korea’s national security structure has reached an extremely dangerous point. What happened this week is not a policy disagreement — it is a direct signal that the current administration is aligning itself with Beijing, even at the expense of the U.S.–ROK alliance. South Korea rejected a U.S.–Japan–ROK joint air exercise proposed by Washington. As a result, the United States and Japan conducted the drill without South Korea on February 16 and 18. This exercise was not symbolic. It involved four B-52 strategic bombers — core assets in America’s Indo-Pacific deterrence posture. Then the situation escalated: 1. On Feb 18, B-52s flew through the East China Sea toward the Yellow Sea. China scrambled fighter jets. 2. U.S. and Chinese aircraft confronted each other — one of the most serious air-to-air encounters in recent years. 3. And during this confrontation, the South Korean government did not support the United States. Instead, the Defense Minister and Joint Chiefs Chairman called the U.S. commander to protest. This has never happened in the history of the alliance. South Korea refused to join the exercise, China sent fighters against U.S. aircraft, and Seoul responded by complaining to Washington, not Beijing. This is not neutrality. This is alignment. According to the report, Washington is now openly concerned that: • the South Korean leadership does not wish to act as a U.S. partner in the First Island Chain • its ‘strategic autonomy’ language mirrors Beijing’s preferred framing • the government wants to restore the 9.19 military restrictions — a move that weakens surveillance, joint drills, and deterrence against China and North Korea In short: The current administration is creating distance from the United States while China, Russia, and North Korea are acting as a unified bloc. This is the clearest evidence so far that South Korea’s ruling government is pivoting toward Beijing’s sphere of influence. Given the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula — and its central role in the First Island Chain — this shift directly undermines U.S. deterrence in the region. I believe this is an urgent matter that the American strategic community must recognize. Source: https://t.co/rRzXJvq981”x .
President Lee's post-China visit statement that "in the harsh international order where there are no eternal enemies, no eternal allies, and no eternal rules, the fate of South Korea rests on pragmatic diplomacy centered on national interests" has drawn criticism from some quarters as signaling realignmentLee Jae-myung, after return from his visit to China: "In the harsh international order where there are no eternal enemies, no eternal allies, and no eternal rules, the fate of South Korea rests on pragmatic diplomacy centered on national interests" https://t.co/YX0JTP4i2jx . European Council on Foreign Relations polling shows that while 42% of South Koreans expect relations with the U.S. to remain strong and 30% expect them to become even stronger, underlying tensions regarding defense burden-sharing, strategic posture toward China, and cost-sharing arrangements remain unresolvedHedging the hegemon: Why Europe and South Korea need each other in the Trump era – European Council on Foreign Relationsecfr .
Tokyo under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has responded to the evolving threat environment with accelerated military development. Japan's defense spending has reached record levels, with the government committing to approximately 2% of GDP by early 2026—placing Japan among the world's top military spenders and in line with NATO's benchmarkJapan's Military Revival and North Korea's Escalationnatoassociation .
Japan has begun acquiring counter-strike capabilities, including longer-range missiles designed to deter imminent attacks, alongside investments in unmanned systems and advanced surveillance platformsJapan's Military Revival and North Korea's Escalationnatoassociation . Prime Minister Takaichi has framed this transformation as "a necessary response to an increasingly severe security environment," emphasizing that Japan "can no longer rely solely on restraint in the face of mounting regional threats"Japan's Military Revival and North Korea's Escalationnatoassociation .
Perhaps most significantly, debate has emerged within Japan regarding its three non-nuclear principles. A senior official from the Prime Minister's Office reportedly suggested "Japan should possess nuclear weapons," while Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi indicated that "all options would be discussed" regarding possible revisions to the principlesRecent statements from the Japanese side on the idea of “possessing nuclear weapons” are deeply troubling: 1⃣ A senior official from Japanese Prime Minister’s Office claimed “Japan should possess nuclear weapons.” 2⃣ Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary declined to make clarifications on the remarks. 3⃣ Asked about possible revisions to the three non-nuclear principles, Japan’s Defense Minister said “all options would be discussed.” 4⃣Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reportedly plans to revise the three non-nuclear principles. The above-mentioned statements amount to a blatant challenge to the postwar international order and the nuclear non-proliferation regime, a serious threat to regional and international peace and stability, and a U-turn from Japan’s commitment to “peaceful development.” Stressing that the idea is a “personal view” is not convincing at all. The international community should be on high alert and firmly against it.x . Chinese nuclear experts estimate Japan could develop nuclear weapons in less than three years given its technical capabilities and plutonium stockpilesBREAKING; CHINESE Nuclear Experts Warn: JAPAN Could Develop Atomic Weapons in Under Three Years Chinese nuclear experts estimate Japan could develop nuclear weapons in less than three years, citing the country's technical capabilities and plutonium stockpiles. In mid-December 2025, a senior Japanese security official advising Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggested Japan should consider possessing nuclear weapons due to regional threats from China, North Korea, and Russia. Japan is widely regarded as a "latent" or "threshold nuclear state" — it has no weapons program but possesses advanced civilian nuclear infrastructure, including reprocessing facilities and a large stockpile of separated plutonium (approximately 45-47 tons as of recent years, enough for thousands of weapons if diverted). Independent expert estimates of how quickly Japan could produce a basic nuclear device (if it decided to) vary:x .
The February 2025 Trump-Ishiba summit joint statement reaffirmed "resolute commitment to the complete denuclearization of the DPRK" and emphasized the importance of Japan-U.S.-South Korean trilateral partnershipKim Jong Un slams US-South Korea-Japan partnership and vows to boost his nuclear program - POLITICOpolitico . Recent U.S.-Japan extended deterrence dialogue in Washington involved "a deep exchange on alliance strategy, defense posture, and nuclear defense policy"US, Japan Warn Over ‘Destabilizing’ Nuclear Buildup by China, North Koreayoutube .
Beijing maintains a calibrated stance regarding the evolving dynamics. China's ambassador to the UN stated that Beijing "will continue to play a constructive role in our way and maintain communication with South Korea" while hoping parties "take effective steps to help resolve the security issues lying at the core of the stalemate"China to play constructive role 'in our way' on N. Korea: top envoykyodonews . Kim's conditional overture, made ahead of Trump's planned April visit to China, suggests Pyongyang may view Beijing as a potential platform for U.S.-DPRK dialogueNorth Korea could 'get along' with US, says Kim Jong Un - BBCbbc .
However, China has firmly rejected participation in nuclear arms control negotiations with the United States and Russia, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stating that requesting China's participation "is neither fair nor reasonable" given its arsenal is "of a completely different scale"🇨🇳☢️China rejected calls to enter talks on a new nuclear treaty: China formally rejected calls to join nuclear disarmament negotiations following the expiration of the New START treaty between the United States and Russia. China maintains that its nuclear capabilities are of a "completely different scale" when compared to those of the U.S. and Russia. Although China's stockpile is expanding quickly, estimated at 600 warheads, it is still considerably smaller than the roughly 4,000 warheads possessed by both the U.S. and Russia. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated that requesting China's participation at this stage is "neither fair nor reasonable".x . China's nuclear stockpile continues expanding rapidly—from approximately 410 warheads in 2023 to 500 in 2024 and around 600 currently, with projections reaching 1,000 by 2030BREAKING: China secretly conducted a massive nuclear test, Reuters reports it involved a strike of hundreds of tons. The U.S. says Beijing tried to hide the test, violating its pledge to ban live nuclear detonations. China claims the U.S. is fueling the arms race. China’s arsenal is rapidly growing: from 410 warheads in 2023 to 500 in 2024, now around 600, with projections to surpass 1,000 by 2030, adding 80–100 new warheads each year. The nuclear balance is shifting fast, and global tensions are rising.x .
China has strongly cautioned against efforts to undermine its economic ties with Russia, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning reaffirming "Beijing's opposition to unilateral sanctions" and stressing that trade with Russia "is legal, mutually beneficial, and should remain free from external interference"Weekly Sanctions Update: January 12, 2026 - Steptoesteptoe .
Russia's March 2024 veto of the UN Panel of Experts mandate renewal—with China abstaining—effectively dismantled the primary multilateral monitoring mechanismSecurity Council Fails to Extend Mandate for Expert Panel Assisting Sanctions Committee on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea | UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releasesun . This represented the first time in 14 years that the Council failed to renew the mandateSecurity Council Fails to Extend Mandate for Expert Panel Assisting Sanctions Committee on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea | UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releasesun . Russia's Ambassador Nebenzya argued the monitoring program had become "divorced from reality" and that sanctions "have not contributed to achieving the goals set by the international community"The West is nervous - Russia blocked UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea Russia has vetoed a UN resolution to maintain the sanctions monitoring regime against North Korea's nuclear program, The Washington Times reports. Russia's permanent representative to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya, said before the vote that the monitoring program began with good intentions - to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region - but had become not only irrelevant, but also "divorced from reality." In addition, he accused the West of trying to strangle Pyongyang with harsh unilateral restrictions, aggressive propaganda and direct threats. “Taken together, all these measures call into question the possibility of solving problems on the peninsula in the future,” Nebenzia said. “In recent years, sanctions have not contributed to achieving the goals set by the international community and have not led to normalization of the situation around the peninsula.” According to him, the actions of South Korea and the United States on the peninsula do not stimulate the parties to dialogue, “especially after Washington demonstrated its dishonest game to the whole world.” At the Security Council vote, Russia spoke out against the resolution, and China abstained. The resolution would extend the mandate of the UN panel of experts in North Korea for another year. This step “nervouses” Western countries, the publication notes. White House spokesman John Kirby called Russia's actions "reckless." In addition, the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan and South Korea published a joint statement in which they criticized Moscow.x .
The Security Council remains "sharply divided" on DPRK policy. A December 2025 U.S. proposal to sanction seven vessels accused of violating UN sanctions was placed on hold by China and Russia until mid-June 2026DPRK (North Korea), February 2026 Monthly Forecast : Security Council Reportsecuritycouncilreport . North Korea has strongly criticized the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team as an "illegal entity outside the United Nations framework"Weekly Sanctions Update: January 12, 2026 - Steptoesteptoe .
In response, eleven nations established the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) in October 2024: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United StatesRelease of the First Report of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT)globalsecurity . The MSMT has published two reports: the first covering unlawful military cooperation including arms transfers between North Korea and Russia (May 2025), and the second focusing on cyber activities and IT worker schemes (October 2025)Release of the Second Report of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT)globalsecurity .
However, questions persist regarding the MSMT's effectiveness. Operating outside the UN framework and without participation from North Korea's two largest trading partners (China and Russia), the mechanism lacks the perceived legitimacy of a Council-mandated entityDPRK (North Korea), November 2025 Monthly Forecast : Security Council Reportsecuritycouncilreport . As one assessment noted, "The success of the MSMT will depend on its ability to maintain impartiality, secure cooperation from a wide range of stakeholders, and translate its findings into meaningful action"The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring: Can the MSMT Pick Up Where the Panel of Experts Left Off? - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea38north .
North Korean hackers stole $2.02 billion in cryptocurrency in 2025, representing approximately 60% of the global total of $3.4 billion stolen that year and a 51% increase from 2024North Korea-linked hackers stole $2.02 billion in cryptocurrency in 2025, according to Chainalysis. This represented about 60% of the global total of $3.4 billion stolen that year. The figure marked a 51% increase from 2024, driven by fewer but larger attacks, including the record $1.5 billion Bybit exchange breach. North Korea's cumulative crypto thefts now exceed $6.75 billion.x . This figure includes the record $1.5 billion Bybit exchange breach2026 Crypto Crime Report Introduction - Chainalysischainalysis . North Korea's cumulative crypto thefts now exceed $6.75 billionNorth Korea-linked hackers stole $2.02 billion in cryptocurrency in 2025, according to Chainalysis. This represented about 60% of the global total of $3.4 billion stolen that year. The figure marked a 51% increase from 2024, driven by fewer but larger attacks, including the record $1.5 billion Bybit exchange breach. North Korea's cumulative crypto thefts now exceed $6.75 billion.x .
This revenue stream represents approximately 6.7% of North Korea's estimated GDP of $29.94 billion in 2025Korean Peninsula Update, January 22, 2026 | ISWunderstandingwar . DPRK operators increasingly rely on "Chinese laundromat" networks—professionalized OTC brokers and underground intermediaries that facilitate off-ramping and settlement at scale2026 Crypto Crime Report – Illicit Crypto Trends & Typologies | TRM Labstrmlabs . Additionally, North Korean IT workers have infiltrated between 345 and 920 jobs globally, generating over $16.58 million in payments since January 20251/ My recent investigation uncovered more than $16.58M in payments since January 1, 2025 or $2.76M per month has been sent to North Korean IT workers hired as developers at various projects & companies. To put this in perspective payments range from $3K-8K per month meaning they have infiltrated 345 jobs on the low end or 920 jobs on the high end.x .
North Korea has also integrated AI into its cyber operations. Recent observations show IT workers incorporating deepfake imagery and voice synthesis into their workflows, including voice modification with female voice profiles and AI-enabled noise cancellation toolsNorth Korea’s Integration of AI Across Cyber, Economic, and Military Domains • Stimson Centerstimson .
UN Security Council resolutions cap refined petroleum exports to North Korea at 500,000 barrels annually. As of December 2025, reported exports stood at 276,477 barrels (55.29% of the cap), with China being the sole reporting source countrySupply, sale or transfer of all refined petroleum products to the DPRK | Security Councilun . However, satellite imagery since June 2024 has shown North Korean tankers with transponders turned off loading Russian oil at Vostochny Port, circumventing the UN limitation through ship-to-ship transfersInternational sanctions against North Korea - Wikipediawikipedia .
The North Korean economy has rebounded substantially, with GDP growth rising from -0.2% in 2022 to 3.1% in 2023 and 3.7% in 2024—growth attributed to sanctions evasion and increased trade with Russia and China alongside "weakening United Nations Security Council sanctions enforcement against the regime since 2023"Korean Peninsula Update, February 10, 2026 | ISWunderstandingwar .
The deepening military partnership between Moscow and Pyongyang represents perhaps the most significant factor undermining sanctions efficacy and enhancing North Korea's strategic leverage.
North Korea now provides between 35% and 50% of Russia's ammunition supply, shipping approximately 200,000 to 260,000 shells of 152mm and 122mm calibers each monthNorth Korea supplies up to half of Russia’s ammunition needsukrainianworldcongress . South Korean intelligence assesses that North Korea may have supplied over 12 million 152mm shells to Russia by the end of 2024🇰🇵 BREAKING: North Korea has supplied over 12 million 152mm artillery shells to Russia — South Korean intelligence reveals. https://t.co/aIt9GLJ8ryx . Beyond ammunition, Pyongyang has delivered multiple rocket launchers and short-range ballistic missiles including KN-23 and KN-24 systems used to strike Ukrainian citiesNorth Korea supplies up to half of Russia’s ammunition needsukrainianworldcongress .
Kim Jong-un has ordered North Korean factories to significantly increase missile and munitions production in 2026 to meet "anticipated requirements for the operations of the state's missile and artillery forces"Kim Jong-un orders North Korea to boost missile production in 2026 | Euronewseuronews . Fifty 600mm multiple rocket launchers were presented to the Ninth Party Congress, with Kim describing them as having "virtually no difference from a high-precision ballistic missile in terms of precision and power" and incorporating "AI technology and compound guidance systems"North Korea's Kim Jong Un says new military goals to be set at party congressnbcnews .
Between 8,500 and 13,000 North Korean soldiers are currently stationed in Russia's Kursk RegionNorth Korea supplies up to half of Russia’s ammunition needsukrainianworldcongress . According to South Korean intelligence, North Korea has suffered approximately 6,000 casualties fighting for RussiaExperts worry about nuclear quid pro quo in Russia-North Korea alliance against Ukrainedefensenews . The U.S. commander in South Korea noted that "the DPRK has demonstrated the ability to send its troops to Russia while simultaneously developing its own capabilities"🇨🇳🇷🇺⚠️ China provides 70% of the machine tools and 90% of the microchips that Russia receives for its industry, — Admiral Samuel Paparo, In exchange, China receives technology to make submarines stealthy and other types of assistance. 🇰🇵 Paparo says the North Korean regime is sending thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of artillery shells and hundreds of tactical missiles to Russia. In return, Pyongyang hopes to receive surface-to-air missiles and other air defense systems. The commander of US forces in South Korea, General Xavier Brunson, says the DPRK has demonstrated the ability to send its troops to Russia while simultaneously developing its own capabilities, including missile technology. Pyongyang is now able to have an army of more than 1.2 million soldiers, which is a modernized, Russian-armed military force.x .
In exchange for military assistance, Russia has reportedly provided significant technology transfers. In September 2025, South Korea's military reported obtaining intelligence suggesting Russia supplied North Korea with two to three nuclear submarine propulsion modules—salvaged from decommissioned Russian submarines—including a reactor, turbine, and cooling systemExperts worry about nuclear quid pro quo in Russia-North Korea alliance against Ukrainedefensenews . Ukrainian intelligence has reported that Russia is transferring "some technologies for low-yield tactical nuclear weapons and submarine missile launch systems"🇰🇵☢️ "In exchange for missiles and people, the DPRK asked Russia for technologies for nuclear weapons", - Budanov ❗️Russia is transferring some technologies for low-yield tactical nuclear weapons and submarine missile launch systems to North Korea. https://t.co/7P2enznj2lx .
The Kremlin has already transferred surface-to-air missile systems to North Korea, including at least one Pantsir short-range air defense system, to strengthen the DPRK's antiquated air defense network🧵 Officially disclosed allied intelligence has confirmed the transfer of advanced Russian weapons systems to North Korea in return for their troop deployment & arms transfers. Among the Russian weapons is at least one Russian Pantsir short-range air defense (SHORAD) system. https://t.co/9LDEsEM3Bpx +1. The KN-23 ballistic missiles have undergone extensive improvements through Russian assistance and now strike with "deadly accuracy"Breaking the North Korea-Russia Missile Axis – The Diplomatthediplomat .
Kim's Congress address outlined an ambitious five-year military development plan emphasizing:
Kim declared it the party's "firm will to further expand and strengthen our national nuclear power" and to "focus on projects to increase the number of nuclear weapons and expand nuclear operational means"North Korea's Kim promises more nuclear weapons as Congress closes with military parade | Reutersreuters .
U.S. acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear state would carry profound implications for the global nonproliferation architecture. North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and conducted its first nuclear test in 2006Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards | International Atomic Energy Agencyiaea . Under the NPT framework, North Korea cannot be formally recognized as a nuclear-armed stateTime to Face Reality: North Korea Is a Nuclear Powertheamericanconservative .
However, the practical reality of accommodating additional nuclear states has precedent: Israel, India, and Pakistan "crashed the nuclear circle and were ultimately accommodated by the major powers"Time to Face Reality: North Korea Is a Nuclear Powertheamericanconservative . As one analyst noted, "if the international nuclear regime could survive Washington's acceptance of other nations as nuclear states, it could survive its acceptance of the North as well"Time to Face Reality: North Korea Is a Nuclear Powertheamericanconservative .
The concern extends to incentive effects: Kim's successful bid for nuclear recognition would demonstrate that "the fact that they possess—and seem willing and ready to use—those weapons is what got them world attention and, eventually, got them a meeting with the president of the U.S.A."“A Dog Whistle to the North Koreans”: Will Trump’s Ignorance (and Bolton’s Impetuousness) Doom the North Korea Summit?vanityfair . South Korean experts warn that the worst-case scenario would involve the United States "effectively recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state and including it as a party to nuclear disarmament negotiations"Trump's 'Tougher Nuclear Disarmament' Initiative: Korea Must ...sedaily .
Kim Jong-un's conditional overture represents a calculated recalibration designed to maximize diplomatic leverage while preserving strategic flexibility. By excluding South Korea from negotiations while conditionally engaging Washington, Pyongyang positions itself for direct bilateral dialogue with the only counterparty it views as capable of delivering meaningful security guarantees—while simultaneously continuing weapons development that enhances its bargaining position.
The efficacy of existing sanctions regimes has been substantially degraded through multiple vectors: the institutional collapse of UN monitoring mechanisms following Russia's veto; massive cyber theft operations generating billions in revenue outside traditional financial channels; the Russia-DPRK military partnership providing both markets for weapons exports and critical technology transfers; and the general weakening of enforcement as China and Russia prioritize other strategic considerations over nonproliferation compliance.
For regional actors, the calculus has shifted decisively. South Korea faces the humiliation of being categorically excluded from diplomatic processes despite extensive concessions—a circumstance that may accelerate debates about strategic autonomy or nuclear hedging. Japan's defense transformation accelerates under perceived existential threat, with previously unthinkable discussions about nuclear weapons now entering mainstream political discourse. And the United States confronts a fundamental choice between maintaining denuclearization as policy while accepting de facto nuclear status in practice, or explicitly pivoting to arms control frameworks that acknowledge North Korea's irreversible nuclear capabilities.
The architecture of Northeast Asian security built over decades—predicated on denuclearization as an achievable goal, multilateral sanctions as an effective tool, and alliance coordination as the mechanism for managing the North Korean threat—now faces structural challenges that Kim's latest overture has brought into sharp relief.