What are the geopolitical ramifications of Hungary’s veto of EU aid to Ukraine on the cohesion of the EU’s collective security framework and future enlargement policy?
Hungary's systematic deployment of its veto power against EU aid to Ukraine has precipitated a constitutional crisis within the European Union, fundamentally challenging the bloc's decision-making architecture while simultaneously fragmenting its collective security posture and complicating enlargement policy for the foreseeable future.
Hungary's blocking actions have exposed critical vulnerabilities in the EU's unanimity-based foreign and security policy. Budapest has vetoed approximately €6.5 billion in European Peace Facility disbursements intended to reimburse member states for weapons donated to UkraineWhat is the European Peace Facility and why Hungary is blocking the disbursements to Ukraine | Euronewseuronews , blocked the EU's 20th sanctions package against RussiaZelensky calls on EU to stop prevaricating and fix entry date for Ukraine — FT - World - TASStass , and threatened to halt a €90 billion loan critical to Ukraine's 2026-2027 financing needs🇭🇺🇺🇦 Hungary vetoes EU's 20th Russia sanctions package and €90 billion loan for Ukraine Budapest demands Kiev unblock Russian oil transit via Druzhba Without the loan, Ukraine can't secure an $8 billion IMF loan and cover its budget and weapons needs over the next two years https://t.co/jAW0DtV3eRx . Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó has explicitly stated that Hungary will not allow "Hungarian taxpayers' money to be used to finance arms supplies to Ukraine"A financial aid package of at least €20 billion for Ukraine is being prepared at today's #FAC. We will not be dragged into this, nor will we let Hungarian taxpayers' money be used to finance arms supplies to Ukraine. Thanks to @realDonaldTrump, the hope for peace has not been this close in the past three years. Any attempt to undermine peace talks is therefore unacceptable.x .
The consequences extend beyond individual policy blockages. Academic analysis from the Oxford academic journal identifies that "the flexibility offered by constructive abstention... does not bind EU Member States to EU decisions, thereby weakening the EU's response to the war in Ukraine"How the war in Ukraine has transformed the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy | Yearbook of European Law | Oxford Academicoup . Hungary has neither provided military support under the EPF, nor allowed weapons transit through its territory, nor participated in EUMAM UA training missionsHow the war in Ukraine has transformed the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy | Yearbook of European Law | Oxford Academicoup .
The EU has responded with unprecedented institutional adaptations. At the December 2025 European Council, member states invoked enhanced cooperation under Article 20 TEU to proceed with the €90 billion Ukraine loan without Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech RepublicEU support for Ukraine for 2026-2027 | Epthinktank | European Parliamentepthinktank . This marked the first time enhanced cooperation has been applied to budgetary decisionsThe hawks didn't win — but putin's friends clearly lost. That's how I'd summarize last night's European Council. Why the glass is rather half full than half empty: → Ukraine will receive €90bn ($105bn) for 2026–27 to cover budgetary and defence needs; → Ukraine will repay this loan only after receiving reparations (Germany held this line); → The EU has taken an unprecedented step by changing the procedure for immobilising russian central bank assets: from unanimous 6m renewals to long-term immobilisation "until russia pays reparations" under art. 122 TFEU. Do not underestimate this move — it shields the assets from Kremlin-friendly veto players and from premature return to russia. → To enable joint borrowing, the EU took another extraordinary step: using art. 20 TEU ("enhanced cooperation") to proceed without Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia. Experts note this article has been used fewer than 10 times before but never for budgetary decisions. Turns out, if there is political will, Europe can break free from Kremlin hostage-taking — permanently! What the glass is still missing: • The original plan was to use the russian central bank assets. A group of countries led by Belgium and Italy blocked this. As a result, European taxpayers will pay — again. What this will mean for support for far-right and populists across the EU, we will see soon enough. • Russia deployed its full arsenal of hybrid pressure and intimidation — including against Belgian leaders and Euroclear management — and this clearly influenced the outcome. However, it's important to understand that backing down doesn't help: Europeans showed the weakness, but the KGB playbook does not spare the weak — it squeezes them harder. If pressure works, why stop? • Germany and the Northern countries opposed joint borrowing, but stepped back recognising that Ukraine's survival is at stake. That, for me, is the real conclusion of this summit: concessions were made by those who understand that russia poses an existential threat not only to Ukraine, but to themselves and to Europe as a whole. Germany joining this camp matters — Europe badly needs a strong leader. Ending on a positive note. Grateful to all the incredible people who worked for months to make the Reparations Loan possible. If these funds are not used by Ukraine now, it means the door remains open to channel them into the Compensation Mechanism. Photo @Tamrico2022x . The European Parliament approved this procedure with 499 votes in favourMEPs approve “enhanced cooperation” for €90 billion EU support loan to Ukraine | News | European Parliamenteuropa .
Individual member states have constructed parallel security architectures outside EU frameworks. France signed a 10-year security agreement with Ukraine providing €3 billion in aid for 2024Zelensky met with Macron in Paris last night and signed a 10-year security agreement. According to the agreement, Ukraine will receive EUR 3 billion from France in aid in 2024. Ukraine received 1.7 bn in 2022 from France and 2.1 bn in 2023 https://t.co/KiVza1Tn2Rx . Belgium committed €977 million in military assistanceBREAKING: Ukraine and Belgium sign bilateral security and long-term support agreement. Belgium will provide EUR 977 million in military aid just this year 🇧🇪🇺🇦 https://t.co/j3EDdQhsepx . Germany has provided over €1.2 billion for stabilising the Ukrainian energy sector plus an additional €400 million winter support packageForeign Affairs Council in Brussels: standing with Ukraine, plus a commitment to sustainable peace in the Middle East - Federal Foreign Office auswaertiges-amt . Denmark and Sweden jointly procured 25 Tridon Mk2 short-range air defence systems worth €247 millionMilitary aid to Ukraine updated with: Pledged; - 🇩🇰🇸🇪 25 Tridon mk2 Short Range Air Defence Systems (joint procurement worth 247 million €) https://t.co/GCnv3eA85k https://t.co/UN9zBHDdvfx .
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas explicitly acknowledged this fragmentation: "Because of Hungary, EU decisions on aid to Ukraine are increasingly difficult. That's why we have a new initiative to form a majority coalition so one country can't block everyone"Because of Hungary, EU decisions on aid to Ukraine are increasingly difficult. That’s why we have a new initiative to form a majority coalition so one country can’t block everyone, — EU foreign policy chief Kaia Kallas https://t.co/v1SZfK5GEKx .
Hungary's vetoes have catalysed serious institutional reform discussions. The Franco-German Working Group on EU Institutional Reform has proposed extending qualified majority voting to CFSP areas before the next enlargementThe EU debate on qualified majority voting in the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Reform and enlargement | OSW Centre for Eastern Studiesosw . Four mechanisms have been advanced: constructive abstention under Article 31(1) TEU, the passerelle clause for non-military CFSP decisions under Article 31(3) TEU, flexible implementation under Article 31(2) TEU, and a new "sovereignty safety net" mechanismThe EU debate on qualified majority voting in the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Reform and enlargement | OSW Centre for Eastern Studiesosw .
Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kestutis Budrys articulated the emerging consensus: "We have to go into the discussion about the decision-making and common foreign security policy and whether we should move to QMV... Another thing is the principles that we have in Article 7, what allows us to reduce the voting rights of one of the member if we cannot proceed further"Change EU rules to stop Hungary's abuse of veto, Lithuanian foreign minister says | Euronewseuronews .
European Council President António Costa recommended changing unanimity rules to allow clusters to be opened with qualified majority supportEU Commission Pushes for Ukraine's Accession by 2028 ...hungarianconservative . The Institut Delors has proposed "unanimity minus one or two members" for sovereignty-sensitive issuesEurope's foreign policy: what is wrong and what needs to be changed - Institut Jacques Delorsinstitutdelors .
Hungary's position has fundamentally restructured regional alliances. The Visegrad Group, once unified during the 2015-2016 migration crisis, has splintered along pro- and anti-Ukraine lines. Poland and the Czech Republic maintain strong support for Kyiv, while Slovakia under Prime Minister Robert Fico has aligned with BudapestCan Visegrad be revived despite differences on Ukraine? - DW.comdw . There have been no V4 summits in 2025 due to irreconcilable policy differencesThe V4 and the future of regional action in Europegisreportsonline .
Prime Minister Orbán has proclaimed a new "V3 cooperation" comprising Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic that opted out of the €90 billion loan, claiming they "spared our children and grandchildren from the burden of this massive loan"We have endured a long and challenging night. We managed to avert the immediate risk of war. We did not allow Europe to issue a declaration of war on Russia by using Russian assets. This plan would have dragged Europe into war and imposed a financial burden of 1000 billion HUF on Hungary. We succeeded in protecting Hungarian families from this. At the same time, 24 member states decided to grant a war loan to Ukraine for the next two years. If Ukraine is unable to repay the loan, those European countries will have to cover the repayment. Thankfully, the V3 cooperation is active once again: Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic have decided not to get on that train. By doing so, we spared our children and grandchildren from the burden of this massive €90 billion loan. Hungary’s share of the war loan would have been more than 400 billion HUF. The bad news is that war preparations are clearly continuing in Brussels. Hungary remains the voice of peace in Europe and will not let Hungarian taxpayers’ money be used to finance Ukraine. Only a government of patriots can guarantee peace and ensure that Hungarian funds are not sent to Ukraine. If there were a Brusselian government in Hungary, they'd push Hungary into war and spend every last dime on supporting Ukraine. We cannot and will not allow this to happen!x . Poland, under Donald Tusk's government, has explicitly distanced itself from this blocCan Visegrad be revived despite differences on Ukraine? - DW.comdw .
The fracture extends beyond economic coordination. Slovakia has threatened to halt emergency electricity exports to Ukraine‼️🇪🇺 𝗘𝗨 𝗦𝘁𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝗖𝗮𝗻’𝘁 𝗙𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝗜𝘁𝘀 𝗦𝗽𝗶𝗻𝗲 𝗼𝗻 𝗔𝗻𝗻𝗶𝘃𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝗼𝗳 𝗥𝘂𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗮’𝘀 𝗜𝗻𝘃𝗮𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻 On the eve of the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Brussels was supposed to project resolve. Not rhetoric. Not another quiet concession that hands the Kremlin a win. Real, Churchill-esque resolve, where image be damned. Europeans rightly apply that standard to the White House. There should be no argument against applying it at home. Two major decisions were on the table: 1. The 20th EU sanctions package targeting Russia’s shadow fleet, energy revenues, and war machine. 2. Confirmation of the €90 billion loan to keep Ukraine functioning. Instead, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council delivered division when it allowed Hungary’s Viktor Orbán to block both. His demand was explicit: Ukraine must immediately restart Russian oil flows through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia. Slovakia’s Robert Fico escalated the pressure further, announcing he would halt emergency electricity exports to Ukraine’s war-damaged grid until Druzhba flows are resumed. Ukrainians are already enduring electricity and heat shortages from sustained Russian bombardment. The facts are straightforward: • The pipeline disruption stems from Russian strikes, not Ukrainian refusal. • Orbán and Fico frame it as Kyiv’s obligation to fix, turning Moscow’s sabotage into leverage against the victim. • They avoid directly confronting Russia, the supplier they still depend on heavily for energy and political cover. Blaming the Kremlin would shatter domestic narratives and risk retaliation that could cut remaining flows. • This reframing lets them punish Ukraine without openly siding with the aggressor. And Brussels, rather than confronting the reality that two pro-Russian EU leaders are actively helping Moscow hurt Ukraine, chooses to preserve the façade of unity. The bloc speaks of cohesion while avoiding the fracture in plain sight. It took four years, but the truth is now visible: whether in Washington or Brussels, when leaders pressure the victim to accommodate the aggressor in the name of stability, they are not practicing pragmatism. They are inverting morality to justify political or economic ends. The Kremlin does not need to divide the West when European and U.S. leaders do it themselves. #OSINTx , and both Hungary and Slovakia have jointly blocked the 20th sanctions package while conditioning their consent on restoration of Russian oil flows through the Druzhba pipelineHungary blocks EU Ukraine loan, Russia sanctions on eve of war anniversary - France 24france24 .
Hungary's enlargement policy exhibits a stark contradiction: systematic obstruction of Ukraine's accession while enthusiastic support for Western Balkans membership. Foreign Minister Szijjártó declared that "Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia could join the EU tomorrow" while Brussels "ignores them, prioritising Ukraine instead"Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia could join the EU tomorrow, bringing enormous economic benefits for all sides. Brussels ignores them, prioritising Ukraine instead. This is not only reckless, it’s dangerous. We won’t stand for it! https://t.co/4rtEAtlwRIx . Hungarian officials argue Western Balkans enlargement would enhance regional stability and push the EU's external border southward to better manage migrationHungary wants Montenegro and Serbia to join EU before 2025 | Euractiveuractiv .
This differential treatment has generated tensions with other member states. In late 2025, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany blocked Hungary's push to advance Serbia's EU accession talks, citing Serbia's strained relations with Kosovo and refusal to join sanctions on RussiaToday, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden & Germany were among countries that blocked Hungary's push to advance Serbia's EU accession talks. They pointed at Serbia's strained relations with Kosovo and refusal to join sanctions on Russia. https://t.co/nbuUOZ662xx .
Hungary has blocked the opening of negotiation clusters for Ukraine despite European Commission assessments that Kyiv has met conditions for clusters 1 (fundamentals), 2 (internal market), and 6 (external relations)European Democracy Support Annual Review 2025 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peacecarnegieendowment . Szijjártó explicitly stated Hungary "will not agree to the opening of the first cluster of negotiations" because it would "destroy Hungarian farmers" and "allow the Ukrainian mafia to penetrate Hungary"🇭🇺🚫🇺🇦 Hungary will not agree to the opening of the first cluster of negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU, — Szijjarto According to him, the Hungarian authorities will not allow "Ukraine to be pushed into the EU" because this will destroy Hungarian farmers, Hungarian food security and "allow the Ukrainian mafia to penetrate Hungary".x .
In December 2025, Hungary's veto prevented adoption of the EU's annual enlargement conclusions entirely, forcing conversion of draft Council conclusions into Presidency conclusions backed by 26 member statesIn the most “geostrategic” year ever, the EU failed to adopt its 2025 enlargement conclusionsnewunionpost . The Commission has signalled willingness to work around this: Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos stated "if we cannot move on with unanimity... we need negotiating positions and benchmarks, so that we can move forward on the working level"EU Commission Pushes for Ukraine's Accession by 2028 ...hungarianconservative .
The blockage has generated proposals to restructure the enlargement process itself. European Council President Costa has proposed that decisions to start negotiations on different parts of the acquis could proceed by qualified majority, with only final closure requiring unanimityEU enlargement momentum risks falling victim to veto powerbruegel .
More controversially, some have proposed admitting new members without full voting rights initially, to address enlargement-sceptical countries' concernsEU enlargement momentum risks falling victim to veto powerbruegel . Others have suggested reviving the European Economic Area model—offering Ukraine single market access by 2029-2030 as a concrete reform anchor while full membership remains blockedHow Can Europe Renew a Stalled Enlargement Process?carnegieendowment .
Legal scholars have proposed invoking Article 10 TEU (arguing Hungary's democratic accountability has eroded) or the "duty of solidarity" in Article 2 TEU to invalidate Hungary's vetoesUkrainian membership of the EU: overcoming Hungary's vetoecpr . More radically, some advocate openly debating Hungary's expulsion to deter further backslidingUkrainian membership of the EU: overcoming Hungary's vetoecpr .
The upcoming Hungarian parliamentary election on 12 April 2026 introduces significant uncertainty. Multiple polls show the opposition Tisza party leading Fidesz by substantial margins—47-48% versus 39-40% in several surveys🇭🇺 Hungary | Legislative Election Nowcast update — February 16, 2026 ➡️ TISZA: 48% | 118 (NEW) 🟧 Fidesz: 39% | 75 (-60) 🟩 MHM: 6% | 6 (=) — 🟦 DK: 4% | 0 (-15) 🔲 MKK: 4% | 0 (=) +/- vs. 2022 📈 @POLITICOEurope polling averages 🗳️ Next election: April 12, 2026 https://t.co/jZTZkuduxtx +1. However, pro-government polling institutes report narrower margins or Fidesz leadsNew Poll by The Center Shows Orbán Leading Ahead of April Election - Hungarian Conservativehungarianconservative .
Tisza leader Péter Magyar has pledged to "end Hungary's international isolation" and make Hungary "a proud and reliable ally"🇭🇺⚡️ “If elected in 2026, I will end Hungary’s international isolation caused by Orbán,” — declared Péter Magyar, leader of Hungary’s opposition party TISZA, addressing a massive crowd in Budapest. “Hungary will once again be a proud and reliable ally,” he promised — drawing a clear line between the pro-Russian stance of Viktor Orbán and a potential return to European solidarity. 📊 According to recent polls, TISZA is currently leading ahead of Orbán’s ruling Fidesz party, signaling a political shift that could reshape Hungary’s foreign policy. ❤️ Notably, a poll conducted by Magyar’s team shows that 58.18% of over 1.1 million respondents support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union — a sharp contrast to the Kremlin-friendly rhetoric we’ve seen from Hungary’s current leadership. If Orbán is Putin’s man in the EU, Magyar may soon become the one who slams that door shut.x . A Tisza victory could unlock frozen EU funds (estimated at over €20 billion)Is This Viktor Orbán’s Last Stand?thenation and lift vetoes on Ukraine support. However, analysts caution that Magyar "largely aligns with Orbán" on key issues including Ukraine, migration, and agriculture, meaning tensions with Brussels would persist even under new leadershipMore Western, Less Eastern – A Post-Orbán Hungary - CEPAcepa .
Orbán has framed the election as a referendum on Ukraine policy, releasing anti-Ukrainian campaign videos and accusing Kyiv of trying to "destabilize Hungary from within"Orban is going all-in. Sensing he might lose the April 12 elections, he is building his campaign on anti-Ukrainian narratives, in particular scaring Hungarians with the prospect of an invasion by the Ukrainian army. Here he releases an anti-Ukrainian pre-election video using footage of Zelenskyy, in which the Hungarian prime minister accuses Kyiv of trying to block oil supplies and destabilize Hungary from within. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for April 12, and according to polls, for the first time in a long while the ruling Fidesz party is trailing the opposition Tisza party led by Péter Magyar.x . U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has stated that Orbán's leadership is "essential" for American interests, with President Trump "committed" to Orbán's successNew Poll by The Center Shows Orbán Leading Ahead of April Election - Hungarian Conservativehungarianconservative .
Hungary's behaviour raises questions about reliability within parallel collective defence frameworks. Article 42.7 TEU—the EU's mutual defence clause—requires member states to provide "aid and assistance by all the means in their power" if another member faces armed aggressionMutual Defence in the European Union? The Imperative of Article 42.7 in Case the United States Abandons European Defence - Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategyvub . Academic analysis notes that "strategic dialogues would require significant confidence-building measures among Europeans, and it seems hard to imagine that discussions on the European dimension of French nuclear defence could immediately start in an EU27 framework, where some actors like Hungary do not hide their proximity to Russia"Mutual Defence in the European Union? The Imperative of Article 42.7 in Case the United States Abandons European Defence - Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategyvub .
The EU institutions have increasingly framed Hungary's vetoes as violations of fundamental treaty obligations. European Council President Costa accused Budapest of "violating the principle of sincere cooperation"Ukraine, commemorations in Kiev and tensions with Hungary over European support - Il Sole 24 OREilsole24ore . Legal experts have called for new Article 7 proceedings against Hungary specifically for lack of solidarity in foreign and security policyArticle 7: Legal experts call for new proceedings against Hungary • Table.Briefingstable .
The December 2025 European Council may represent "the beginning of the end of unanimity in EU foreign policy"The European Council That Quietly Ended the Era of the National Veto | IEP@BUunibocconi . By choosing not to fully exercise their veto on the MFF amendments and Article 122 asset freezes, Hungary and its allies "demonstrated that the costs of obstructing the will of an overwhelming majority of the EU are too high to consider"The European Council That Quietly Ended the Era of the National Veto | IEP@BUunibocconi .
However, the precedent is double-edged. Each instance of vetoing "creates institutional precedents that may encourage future obstructionist tactics by any member state seeking leverage in unrelated negotiations"Hungary Threatens EU Sanctions Over Ukrainian Oil Pipeline Crisisdiscoveryalert . The EU's enlargement process alone contains over 150 points where vetoes could be exercisedEU enlargement momentum risks falling victim to veto powerbruegel .
Hungary's veto strategy has produced three structural outcomes for the EU's collective security and enlargement architecture:
First, institutional adaptation through workarounds has become normalised. Enhanced cooperation, voluntary contribution mechanisms, bilateral security agreements, and creative legal interpretations of existing treaty provisions now constitute a parallel governance structure operating alongside—and frequently around—formal EU decision-making.
Second, the unanimity principle has been functionally weakened without formal treaty change. The political costs of persistent obstruction have escalated, and the December 2025 precedents demonstrate that determined majorities can find pathways forward even when one or two member states object.
Third, enlargement policy has bifurcated between a blocked Ukraine track and a slowly advancing Western Balkans track, creating policy incoherence that undermines the credibility of the EU's merit-based accession framework.
The European Political Community has emerged as a supplementary forum for coordinating security responses with broader European participationEuropean Political Community meets in Copenhagen to discuss security in Europe - EU NEIGHBOURS easteuneighbourseast , while the Coalition of the Willing concept has gained traction as a last-resort mechanismFinancing Ukraine in 2026 and 2027: Reparations loan, revision of long-term EU budget or alternative solution? | Think Tank | European Parliamenteuropa . Whether these adaptations represent permanent structural changes or temporary expedients pending political change in Budapest will likely be determined by the April 2026 Hungarian election—and by whether EU institutions succeed in translating the December 2025 precedents into durable governance reforms.