What legal precedents and geopolitical consequences could arise from state‑level retaliation against U.S. bases, considering norms of sovereignty and proportionality under international law?
State-level retaliation against U.S. military bases abroad implicates foundational principles of international law—self-defense, sovereignty, and proportionality—while generating far-reaching geopolitical consequences that reshape regional security architectures and alliance structures.
The legal permissibility of state retaliation against U.S. bases rests on two primary pillars of international law: the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the self-defense exception codified in Article 51Chapter VII: Article 51 — Charter of the United Nations — Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs — Codification Division Publicationsun . Article 51 provides that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations"Chapter VII: Article 51 — Charter of the United Nations — Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs — Codification Division Publicationsun . The triggering condition—an "armed attack"—establishes a high threshold that not all uses of force satisfy.
The International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States (1986) established that an armed attack includes "the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to" an actual armed attack conducted by regular forcesMilitary and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)icj-cij +1. However, the Court explicitly held that "assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support" does not constitute an armed attack, though it may amount to a use of force or interventionJudgment of 27 June 1986 | INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICEicj-cij .
Contemporary international law prohibits resort to force to threaten or attack other countries. Article 2(4) states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state"The Use of Force by States Under International Law | Future Forgedefence . The only exceptions are Security Council authorization under Chapter VII or self-defense under Article 51Are the US–Israeli strikes on Iran legal under international law? | Middle East Eyemiddleeasteye .
The customary international law requirements for self-defense derive from the 1837 Caroline incident, which established that defensive action requires "necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation" and that any response "must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it"The use of force in international law: 1.3 The use of force in self-defence | OpenLearn - Open Universityopen +1.
The Caroline test imposes two distinct requirements: (1) the use of force must be necessary because the threat is imminent and peaceful alternatives are unavailable; and (2) the response must be proportionate to the threatCaroline test - Wikipediawikipedia +1. The proportionality principle requires that "no more force be used than needed to prevent further attacks, either by depriving the adversary of the means to conduct them or by convincing it to refrain from doing so"Retaliation, Retribution, and Punishment and International Law - Lieber Institute West Pointwestpoint .
The ICJ has consistently affirmed these requirements. In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the Court stated that "the submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international law"[PDF] The Contribution of the ICJ Judgment of 6 November 2003 in theesil-sedi . The Nicaragua case similarly established that "self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it"ICJ, Nicaragua v. United States | How does law protect in war? - Online casebookicrc .
The 2003 Oil Platforms case between Iran and the United States provides critical guidance on what qualifies as lawful self-defenseOil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)icj-cij . The Court held that "the United States could exercise such a right of self-defence only if it had been the victim of an armed attack by Iran and the United States actions must have been necessary and proportional to the armed attack against it"Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)icj-cij .
The Court found that the United States failed to discharge its burden of proving an armed attack by Iran. Regarding the 1987 missile attack on the Sea Isle City, "the evidence indicative of Iranian responsibility for the attack on the Sea Isle City is not sufficient to support the contentions of the United States"[PDF] CASE CONCERNING OIL PLATFORMS - National Security Archivegwu . On necessity, the Court noted "there is no evidence that the United States complained to Iran of the military activities of the platforms…which does not suggest that the targeting of the platforms was seen as a necessary act"Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decisionyale .
On proportionality, the Court concluded that Operation Praying Mantis—which involved "not only the attack on the oil platforms, but also the destruction of two Iranian frigates and a number of other naval vessels and aircraft"—exceeded what could be considered a proportionate response to "the mining, by an unidentified agency, of a single United States warship, which was severely damaged but not sunk, and without loss of life"The World Court Finds that U.S. Attacks on Iranian Oil Platforms in 1987-1988 Were Not Justifiable as Self-Defense, but the United States Did Not Violate the Applicable Treaty with Iran | ASILasil .
International law draws a sharp distinction between lawful self-defense and prohibited armed reprisals. "Self-defense never authorizes you to take measures in retribution or revenge or reprisal"Questions Persist Over Legality of US Killing of Iranian Generalvoanews . Self-defense is permitted only to halt ongoing attacks or prevent imminent ones, whereas reprisals—acts of retaliation for past wrongs—are "acts (actions or omissions) that would otherwise violate international humanitarian law"Retaliation, Retribution, and Punishment and International Law - Lieber Institute West Pointwestpoint .
The temporal element is critical. "If further attacks can reasonably be expected, the question becomes whether there are non-forcible measures, such as negotiation or referral of the matter to the UN Security Council, that might, in the circumstances, effectively prevent or deter them"Retaliation, Retribution, and Punishment and International Law - Lieber Institute West Pointwestpoint . An action motivated by retaliation, retribution, or punishment cannot qualify as lawful self-defense; "its unlawful character remains intact"Retaliation, Retribution, and Punishment and International Law - Lieber Institute West Pointwestpoint .
Iran's January 8, 2020 missile strike on U.S. bases at Ain al-Asad and Erbil following the U.S. killing of General Qassem Soleimani provides a significant precedent for state-level retaliationOperation Martyr Soleimani - Wikipediawikipedia . The Iraqi military confirmed that "between 1:45am and 2:15am Iraq was hit by 22 missiles, 17 on the Ain al-Assad airbase and…five on the city of Erbil"Iraqi PM received ‘verbal message’ from Iran about missile attack | Soleimani assassination News | Al Jazeeraaljazeera .
International legal scholars assessed this strike as potentially lawful self-defense. "International law does allow for defensive reprisals – which would probably cover Iran's Jan. 8 missile attacks on U.S. bases based in Iraq, which killed nobody but did damage property"The US-Iran conflict and the consequences of international law-breakingtheconversation . The principle of self-defense "allows reprisals, so long as they are proportional to the original attack and directed against military targets. In light of the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal, which Iran appeared to be respecting, and its act of war in killing Soleimani, the missile attacks seem a measured – even minimalist – justified response"The US-Iran conflict and the consequences of international law-breakingtheconversation +1.
The Iranian strike demonstrated deliberate proportionality calibration. As one observer noted, "This doesn't yet feel like a major escalation. Iran can claim it took revenge. Feels more like an escalation to deescalate"Deep Breaths As We Go From Crisis to Status Quotheamericanconservative . Iran's Foreign Minister Javad Zarif "tweeted that Iran was finished fighting and was not actively pursuing further escalation"Deep Breaths As We Go From Crisis to Status Quotheamericanconservative .
Attacks on U.S. bases located in third-party states raise complex sovereignty questions. Under international law, "US bases abroad remain the sovereign territory of the host country"For your 1st question, Under international law, US bases abroad remain the sovereign territory of the host country. If they haven’t attacked Iran it doesn’t have the right to attack the host country. In all these, both sides have their issues so no one is the black sheep. https://t.co/iI0TctWEcrx . This creates a legal conundrum: "Iran may invoke self-defence against the U.S. if responding to an armed attack—but launching missiles at bases on third-state territory also implicates those states' sovereignty and the UN Charter rules on the use of force. Unless host states are treated as participants in the conflict (fact-dependent: consent, operational involvement, degree of support), such strikes are also presumptively unlawful"🚨 This morning the #US 🇺🇸 and #Israel 🇮🇱 carried out strikes inside #Iran 🇮🇷, describing them as aimed at stopping “imminent threats”. ⚖️ Are the U.S. strikes illegal under #internationalLaw? Under the @UN Charter 🇺🇳, the use of force is presumptively unlawful unless: - UN #SecurityCouncil authorization, or - Self-defense after an armed attack, and the response meets necessity and proportionality. So the key legal question is evidence: if an actual armed attack (or a legally persuasive case of imminence) is not demonstrated, the strikes risk violating the prohibition on the use of force. #ImminentThreats rhetoric by itself is not a blank check. 🛡️ And Iran’s attacks on U.S. bases in #Kuwait 🇰🇼, #Bahrain 🇧🇭, #SaudiArabia 🇸🇦, #Qatar 🇶🇦 and the #UAE 🇦🇪? Iran may invoke self-defense against the U.S. if responding to an armed attack—but launching missiles at bases on third-state territory also implicates those states’ sovereignty and the UN Charter rules on the use of force. Unless host states are treated as participants in the conflict (fact-dependent: consent, operational involvement, degree of support), such strikes are also presumptively unlawful. 📝 Even when self-defense is claimed, #InternationalHumanitarianLaw governs how attacks are conducted: 🎯 distinction, proportionality, precautions. Civilian harm can make an operation unlawful even if the broader “self-defense” claim is argued. #Iran #Trump #Netanyahu #AyatollahAliKhamenei #MiddleEastCrisis #UNCharter #InternationalLaw #IHL #UseOfForce #Geopolitics #airstrikex .
The consent of the host state is a critical legal factor. "Consent allows an outside state to lawfully intervene in a host state's sovereign territory, addressing the jus ad bellum question"The Law of Consent-Based Interventionsjustsecurity . The UN has tended to "prioritize the consent of the host-state in recognition of their sovereign rights to control their territories"Host-Country Consent in UN Peacekeeping • Stimson Centerstimson .
Status of Forces Agreements establish the legal framework for U.S. military presence but do not authorize combat operations. "A SOFA does not authorize specific military operations or missions; rather, it provides the framework for legal protections and rights while U.S. personnel are present in a country. A SOFA does not impact or diminish the inherent right of self-defence"Status of Forces Agreements and UN Mandates: What Protections Do They Provide to U.S. Personnel?youtube . SOFAs "are often included, along with other types of military agreements, as part of a comprehensive security arrangement with a particular country. A SOFA itself does not constitute a security arrangement"Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized? - EveryCRSReport.comeverycrsreport .
The controversial "unwilling or unable" doctrine permits strikes in third-party states when the territorial state cannot or will not suppress threats emanating from its territoryUnwilling or Unable: Toward a Normative Framework for... | University of Virginia School of Lawvirginia . However, this doctrine "has not acquired customary status due to inconsistent state practice"Dealing With Non-State Actors In International Law: The “Unwilling And Unable Doctrine” — The Fletcher Forum of World Affairsfletcherforum .
The doctrine's legal status remains highly contested. "Countries like Russia and China, for example, have been quite critical. They often raise concerns about state sovereignty and argue it could undermine the UN charter system if states start unilaterally deciding when another state is unwilling or unable"India’s Right to Self-Defense Under UN Charter Explained 🔍 | International Law 2025 🌍🕊️- 927youtube . The Non-Aligned Movement's 120 members "have argued strongly against it"German Parliament: US Presence in Syria Is Illegalglobalresearch .
Scholarly analysis indicates that "the purported new rule is supported without caveat by only five States (USA, Australia, Israel, Turkey, UK)"SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS: ARE POWERFUL STATES WILLING BUT UNABLE TO CHANGE INTERNATIONAL LAW? | International & Comparative Law Quarterly | Cambridge Corecambridge . This limited state practice raises questions about whether the doctrine reflects customary international law.
When a state seeks to justify retaliation against another state based on proxy attacks, the question of attribution becomes central. The ICJ's "effective control" test requires proof "that the State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed"Language as Door-Opener for Violence? How a New “Attribution-Narrative” May Lead to Armed Confrontation between Iran, and the US and Saudi-Arabiaopiniojuris . "Heavy subsidies and other support" alone is "not deemed sufficient for attribution"Language as Door-Opener for Violence? How a New “Attribution-Narrative” May Lead to Armed Confrontation between Iran, and the US and Saudi-Arabiaopiniojuris .
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia articulated a less stringent "overall control" test requiring that a state "provide the non-State entity with financial and training assistance, military equipment and/or operational support" and "participate in the organization, co-ordination or planning of operations"Attribution - International cyber law: interactive toolkitccdcoe . The ICJ, however, explicitly rejected this lower threshold for state responsibility purposes in the Bosnian Genocide case[PDF] “Little Green Men” in a Legal Gray Area: International Responsibility for Proxy Warslu .
The January 2020 Iraqi parliamentary resolution to expel U.S. forces illustrates how retaliatory strikes can trigger host-state sovereignty assertions. "On 5 January 2020, the Council of Representatives of Iraq voted to obligate Iraq's government 'to work towards ending the presence of all foreign troops on Iraqi soil'"Withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq (2020–2021) - Wikipediawikipedia . The resolution stated that "the Iraqi government must work to end the presence of any foreign troops on Iraqi soil and prohibit them from using its land, airspace or water for any reason"Legal Consequences of the continued presence of US forces in Iraq - Research Society of International Law | RSILrsilpak .
The legal effect of this vote remained contested. "It was initially unclear if the resolution was binding and no timetable for withdrawal was set"Withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq (2020–2021) - Wikipediawikipedia . The Strategic Framework Agreement "is unequivocal: 'The temporary presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is at the full request and invitation of the sovereign Government of Iraq and with full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq'"Iraq's Vote to Expel U.S. Troops Is Iran's True Victory | RANDrand . If the prime minister signed the resolution into law, "American troops would have to be withdrawn"Iraq's Vote to Expel U.S. Troops Is Iran's True Victory | RANDrand .
Attacks on U.S. bases in allied territory raise questions about collective defense obligations. NATO's Article 5 states that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all"Willfully Vague: Why NATO’s Article 5 Is So Misunderstood - CEPAcepa . However, "Article 5 does not commit member states to deploy military assets if an ally is attacked. It only commits them to some form of response"Willfully Vague: Why NATO’s Article 5 Is So Misunderstood - CEPAcepa .
The ambiguity was intentional. "It was crafted in response to US reservations about the depth of its military obligations as a member of a transatlantic defense alliance"Willfully Vague: Why NATO’s Article 5 Is So Misunderstood - CEPAcepa . Each member state retains discretion to take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force"North Atlantic Treaty - Wikipediawikipedia +1.
Article 5 has been invoked only once—following the September 11, 2001 attacksNATO has invoked Article 5 only once in its history | George W. Bush Presidential Centerbushcenter +1. Importantly, "the article is concerned with protecting NATO territory, not NATO troops"Willfully Vague: Why NATO’s Article 5 Is So Misunderstood - CEPAcepa . Attacks on U.S. forces outside NATO territory may not automatically trigger collective defense obligations.
The Security Council's response to state-level military strikes is typically gridlocked by veto politics. The Council can authorize force under Chapter VII if "necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security"The Use of Force by States Under International Law | Future Forgedefence . However, as demonstrated repeatedly, "Russia has a veto. China has a veto. Both will block any resolution supporting the US and Israel. The U.S. has a veto. It will block any resolution condemning the strikes"🚨🇷🇺🇮🇷 Russia just called for an emergency UN Security Council meeting. France called for one hours ago. Russia has a veto. China has a veto. Both will block any resolution supporting the US and Israel. The U.S. has a veto. It will block any resolution condemning the strikes. Everyone knows how this meeting ends before it starts.x .
Through the end of 2024, "Russia and the Soviet Union had cast approximately 120 vetoes, the United States 89, the United Kingdom 29, and France and China 16 each"United Nations Security Council - Wikipediawikipedia . This pattern ensures that "any attempt to pass a resolution either supporting or condemning the strikes will be blocked immediately, leaving the Security Council gridlocked while the crisis continues on the ground"@MarioNawfal Exactly — it’s a show meeting more than a decision-making one. With the veto powers in play, any attempt to pass a resolution either supporting or condemning the strikes will be blocked immediately, leaving the Security Council gridlocked while the crisis continues on the ground. https://t.co/pGvHOHvZ18x .
The 2018 Syria strikes illustrated this dynamic. Russia's draft resolution condemning U.S.-led strikes "was defeated by a recorded vote of 8 against to 3 in favour, with 4 abstentions"Following Air Strikes against Suspected Chemical Weapons Sites in Syria, Security Council Rejects Proposal to Condemn Aggression | UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releasesun . The U.S. defended its actions as "not in revenge, punishment or a symbolic show of force, but to deter the future use of chemical weapons"Following Air Strikes against Suspected Chemical Weapons Sites in Syria, Security Council Rejects Proposal to Condemn Aggression | UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releasesun .
The April 2018 U.S.-UK-France strikes on Syria provide insights into how major powers manage escalation when strikes occur near adversary military personnel. Russia "condemned US-led military strikes in Syria as an 'act of aggression' and said Russia would convene an emergency session of the UN security council"Vladimir Putin calls US-led Syria strikes an 'act of aggression' | Syria | The Guardiantheguardian .
Despite harsh rhetoric, Russia refrained from military retaliation. "It did not appear late on Saturday morning that the attack would trigger a military response from Russia, as Moscow reported that the missiles had steered clear of Russian military bases in the country"Vladimir Putin calls US-led Syria strikes an 'act of aggression' | Syria | The Guardiantheguardian . Russian officials "said the missiles launched by the coalition of French, British and US forces did not enter the airspace protected by their air defence systems"Vladimir Putin calls US-led Syria strikes an 'act of aggression' | Syria | The Guardiantheguardian .
The strikes demonstrated careful escalation management. "Avoiding targets near Russian and Iranian forces constrained planners' ability to exact a heavier price from Assad's regime"Strikes On Syria Are A Game Changer | Proceedings - May 2018 144/5/1,383usni . The coalition acted "in a deliberate manner that aims to deescalate the overall situation"Strikes On Syria Are A Game Changer | Proceedings - May 2018 144/5/1,383usni .
State-level attacks on U.S. bases have catalyzed significant regional security realignments. Following the 2020 Iran tensions, "Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Arab states originally opposed the Iran nuclear deal and staunchly supported Trump's efforts to isolate Iran"Iran's 2020 attack on US base underscored maximum pressure folly | Responsible Statecraftresponsiblestatecraft . However, "by the final year of Trump's administration, the UAE had broken from the maximum pressure campaign"Iran's 2020 attack on US base underscored maximum pressure folly | Responsible Statecraftresponsiblestatecraft .
The UAE "began sending delegations to Iran to de-escalate in 2019 after attacks on its tankers"Iran's 2020 attack on US base underscored maximum pressure folly | Responsible Statecraftresponsiblestatecraft . Saudi Arabia "also began seeking de-escalation, and, according to Iraqi officials, Soleimani was in fact carrying Iran's response to a Saudi invitation for talks when he was assassinated"Iran's 2020 attack on US base underscored maximum pressure folly | Responsible Statecraftresponsiblestatecraft . "Most significantly, the Arab Persian Gulf states now support the restoration of the nuclear deal they once vehemently opposed"Iran's 2020 attack on US base underscored maximum pressure folly | Responsible Statecraftresponsiblestatecraft .
Following the 2020 strikes, the U.S. significantly enhanced base defenses. "By 13 April, the U.S. had installed and activated Patriot air defense systems which have anti-ballistic missile capabilities, an Army C-RAM system, and an AN/TWQ-1 Avenger at Al Asad Airbase and the base at Erbil, and at Camp Taji"Operation Martyr Soleimani - Wikipediawikipedia . The U.S. also imposed "new economic sanctions on Iran that targeted the country's metals industry" and "sanctioned eight senior Iranian officials who were involved in the missile attacks"Operation Martyr Soleimani - Wikipediawikipedia .
Recent events in February 2026 demonstrate the potential for state-level retaliation to produce catastrophic regional consequences. Following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, "Iranian missiles have already struck US military facilities in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Iranian missiles have targeted Kuwaiti territory"Iran Targets U.S. Bases After Tehran Strikes Escalate Conflictyoutube . The IRGC declared that "all US military bases, resources, and interests across the entire Middle East are now legitimate targets"Iran Targets U.S. Bases After Tehran Strikes Escalate Conflictyoutube .
The scope of retaliation was unprecedented. "Iran launched coordinated strikes across the region" targeting Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAEIran launches coordinated strikes across the region. 🇮🇱 #Israel 🇸🇦 #SaudiArabia 🇶🇦 #Qatar 🇰🇼 #Kuwait 🇧🇭 #Bahrain 🇦🇪 #UAE Multiple US military installations and strategic targets reportedly hit within minutes. The Middle East is on edge. ⏳🔥 https://t.co/p5JWHW4HOLx . Kuwait's Ministry of Foreign Affairs "condemned the Iranian strikes as a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of the state of Kuwait and its airspace, cited article 51 of the United Nations charter"Iran Targets U.S. Bases After Tehran Strikes Escalate Conflictyoutube .
The conflict triggered massive U.S. force deployments. "50 fighter jets (F-22 and F-35), 150 transport aircraft with weapons, 35 warships, including two aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines" were moved to the region, with "ground forces consist[ing] of about 50,000 military personnel"The US has deployed its largest forces to the Middle East since the invasion of Iraq The US is transferring a record-breaking group to the region: 50 fighter jets (F-22 and F-35), 150 transport aircraft with weapons, 35 warships, including two aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. The ground forces consist of about 50,000 military personnel. Israel is ready to join. Sources estimate the likelihood of a strike on Iran at 90%.x . This represented "the largest concentration of American military power in that region since the 2003 Iraq war"US military stages largest Middle East buildup since Iraq waryoutube .
Iran's military strategy aims to transform "American bases in the Middle East into strategic liabilities, or hostages of fortune"Did Iran Drop a Dirty Bomb on US Forces? | Hudson Institutehudson . The objective is "raising the cost for America to defend its forward-bases from potential Iranian barrages. Once the cost of sustaining air and missile defense architectures around American bases reaches an unsustainable level, the troops stationed there become extremely vulnerable"Did Iran Drop a Dirty Bomb on US Forces? | Hudson Institutehudson .
This strategic calculus has influenced U.S. basing decisions. New facilities like "Logistical Support Area Jenkins in Saudi Arabia" are positioned "on the Red Sea at 24.22619° N, 38.24876° E facing Egypt rather than Iran & hence its outside the range of Iranian SRBMs"There’s a new U.S. Army base called Logistical Support Area (LSA) Jenkins in Saudi Arabia that’s been expanding recently. It’s on the Red Sea at 24.22619° N, 38.24876° E facing Egypt rather than Iran & hence its outside the range of Iranian SRBMs (unlike Prince Sultan Air Base, Al-Udied, or Al-Dhafra). Essentially the U.S. was anticipating a possible conflict with Iran & wanted to relocate U.S. military infrastructure away from their missiles & drones. LSA Jenkins is planned to become a major logistics hub for US forces in the Middle East & will include munitions storages, living areas for troops & contractors, and maintenance facilities. There’s also a specialized section at the right that looks like it’ll be for U.S. Army MIM104s or THAADs & X-band AN/TPY-2 early warning radars.x . The facility is "planned to become a major logistics hub for US forces in the Middle East" including "munitions storages, living areas for troops & contractors, and maintenance facilities"There’s a new U.S. Army base called Logistical Support Area (LSA) Jenkins in Saudi Arabia that’s been expanding recently. It’s on the Red Sea at 24.22619° N, 38.24876° E facing Egypt rather than Iran & hence its outside the range of Iranian SRBMs (unlike Prince Sultan Air Base, Al-Udied, or Al-Dhafra). Essentially the U.S. was anticipating a possible conflict with Iran & wanted to relocate U.S. military infrastructure away from their missiles & drones. LSA Jenkins is planned to become a major logistics hub for US forces in the Middle East & will include munitions storages, living areas for troops & contractors, and maintenance facilities. There’s also a specialized section at the right that looks like it’ll be for U.S. Army MIM104s or THAADs & X-band AN/TPY-2 early warning radars.x .
International law distinguishes between attacks on diplomatic premises and military installations. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that "the premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission"Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961): “The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.” Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961): “The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage…” — Footage shows the soldiers pointing directly and shooting at the diplomates.x . Similarly, under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, "consular premises shall be inviolable"Under UN Charter, Iran’s Attack Was a Legal Response to Israel’s Illegal Attacktruthout .
Israel's April 2024 attack on Iran's consulate in Damascus "constituted an act of aggression, which triggered Iran's right to self-defense"Under UN Charter, Iran’s Attack Was a Legal Response to Israel’s Illegal Attacktruthout . UN experts agreed that Iran had "a right to respond" though they argued self-defense "is only lawful where it is necessary to stop a continuing armed attack"Of Proxies, Self-Defence and Reprisalsopiniojuris .
Military bases, by contrast, are legitimate military targets under international humanitarian law when attacked by a state with which the defending state is in armed conflict. "Article 51 states, 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations'"Under UN Charter, Iran’s Attack Was a Legal Response to Israel’s Illegal Attacktruthout . An armed attack "includes not just an attack against the territory of a state, including its airspace and territorial sea, but also attacks directed against its armed forces or embassies abroad"Under UN Charter, Iran’s Attack Was a Legal Response to Israel’s Illegal Attacktruthout .
The legal framework governing state-level retaliation against U.S. bases remains contested and evolving. While Article 51 preserves an inherent right of self-defense, the requirements of necessity and proportionality impose significant constraintsThe Legitimate Aims of Self-Defense - Lieber Institute West Pointwestpoint . The ICJ's jurisprudence establishes that defensive measures must be "necessary to respond to" the armed attack and "proportionate" to the threat facedOil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)icj-cij .
The geopolitical consequences of such retaliation extend far beyond immediate military effects. Regional alliances may fracture or realign, host states may revoke consent for U.S. presence, and the risk of broader conflict escalation increases substantiallyIran's 2020 attack on US base underscored maximum pressure folly | Responsible Statecraftresponsiblestatecraft +1. The Security Council's structural paralysis ensures that legal determinations will continue to be contested rather than definitively resolved through multilateral mechanismsUnited Nations Security Council - Wikipediawikipedia .
As one NATO military intelligence official observed after the 2020 strikes, "now we enter a new stage where the Iranians will let their proxies in Iraq conduct operations within the context of the Iraqi political arena, while also pursuing a much sharper retaliation against US targets going forward that will be designed to be ambiguous in terms of taking credit, and are likely to be more deadly"Iran's retaliation for Qassem Soleimani's death may not be finished. The real revenge could take years to materialize.businessinsider . This forecast has proven prescient, as the distinction between state and proxy action continues to blur, complicating both legal assessment and strategic response.