What are the geopolitical and strategic implications of former UK leaders advocating for non‑combat troop deployments to Ukraine on NATO cohesion and escalation risk?
The advocacy by former and current UK leaders for deploying non-combat military personnel to Ukraine represents a watershed moment in European security policy, exposing fundamental tensions within NATO over burden-sharing, strategic direction, and the transatlantic relationship while simultaneously raising profound questions about escalation dynamics with Russia.
The trajectory of British positioning on Ukraine has shifted dramatically. In February 2015, then-Defence Secretary Michael Fallon assured Parliament that deploying UK military trainers would not constitute mission creep, emphasizing "We are not deploying combat troops to Ukraine and we will not do so"Sending UK advisers to Ukraine will not lead to mission creep, Fallon tells MPs | Ukraine | The Guardiantheguardian . A decade later, this cautious approach has given way to explicit advocacy for ground presence.
Former Prime Minister Boris Johnson has emerged as a vocal proponent of immediate deployment, arguing that UK and allied forces should be sent to Ukraine "right now" in non-combat roles to "flip a switch" in Vladimir Putin's strategic calculationsUK should send non-combat troops to Ukraine now, former ... - BBCbbc . Johnson's rationale centers on demonstrating Western commitment: "If we are willing to do it in the context of a ceasefire, which of course puts all the initiative, all the power in Putin's hands, why not do it now? There is no logical reason that I can see why we shouldn't send peaceful ground forces there to show our support, our constitutional support for a free, independent Ukraine"UK should send non-combat troops to Ukraine now, former PM Boris Johnson tells BBC - BBC Newsbbc .
Current Prime Minister Keir Starmer has adopted a more conditional but equally consequential position, becoming the first sitting UK prime minister to explicitly state readiness to deploy British peacekeepers. Writing in the Daily Telegraph, Starmer declared the UK "ready to play a leading role" in Ukraine's defence, including "being ready and willing to contribute to security guarantees to Ukraine by putting our own troops on the ground if necessary"Starmer ready to put British troops on the ground in Ukraine if peace deal reachedtheguardian . He acknowledged the gravity of this commitment: "I do not say that lightly. I feel very deeply the responsibility that comes with potentially putting British servicemen and women in harm's way"Prime Minister Keir Starmer's article in the Telegraph: 17 February 2025www .
These UK initiatives have crystallized into a multinational framework operating explicitly outside NATO structures. French President Emmanuel Macron announced that 26 countries have "formally committed" to deploy a "reassurance force" to Ukraine following any peace agreementPost-war 'reassurance force' for Ukraine would not 'seek to wage war' on Russia, Macron saysfrance24 . This force, co-led by the UK and France, represents an unprecedented European security architecture developed independently of the Atlantic Alliance.
The coalition's sixth summit in July 2025 formalized plans for a Multinational Force Ukraine with a permanent multinational operative headquarters under UK-French leadership, rotating between Paris and London, plus a coordinating center in Kyiv headed by a two-star British generalBriefing by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, Moscow, July 17, 2025globalsecurity . Macron and Starmer announced plans for joint air patrols with Ukraine and maritime operations as part of an anti-mine group, with the potential French-British contingent expanding from a brigade to an army corps of approximately 50,000 troopsBriefing by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, Moscow, July 17, 2025globalsecurity .
The coalition's security framework envisions a multi-layered deterrence system. According to French officials, the first line of defense remains the Ukrainian army, supported by coalition assistance. The second layer comprises the reassurance force stationed in Ukraine but not on frontlines. The third layer—and the most contested element—is a US "backstop" providing the ultimate security guaranteeMacron says Europe 'ready' to offer security guarantees to Ukraine • FRANCE 24 Englishyoutube .
The UK proposals have exposed and exacerbated existing fault lines within the Western alliance. US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth delivered an unambiguous message to NATO allies: "There will not be U.S. troops deployed to Ukraine," and NATO's Article 5 protections "should not apply to any European forces sent to Ukraine for a postwar settlement"Hegseth Rules Out U.S. Peacekeeping Troops for Ukraineforeignpolicy . This position represents a fundamental departure from Cold War precedents where American forces served as the primary guarantor of European security.
The Trump administration has framed this as burden-shifting rather than abandonment. Hegseth urged NATO members to increase required defence spending from 2 percent to 5 percent of GDP, stating that "Europe must provide the overwhelming share of future lethal and nonlethal aid to Ukraine" given that the strategic threat from China means the United States cannot be "primarily focused on the security of Europe"Hegseth Rules Out U.S. Peacekeeping Troops for Ukraineforeignpolicy .
This has created what analysts describe as a credibility paradox. European leaders insist the coalition requires American backing to function effectively. UK Defence Secretary John Healey confirmed that military planners from "38-plus nations" have spent six months developing deployment plans, but Prime Minister Starmer has stated "there must be a U.S. security commitment for European countries to put boots on the ground"European leaders meet to discuss Ukraine as UK troop offer hardens regional resolvejapantoday +1.
Beyond the transatlantic rift, the proposals have revealed stark divergences among European allies. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that the deployment process "cannot happen without Russia's consent," positioning Berlin in opposition to the more forward-leaning UK-French approach🇺🇦🇷🇺 No NATO troops in Ukraine without Russian approval — Germany's Merz The German Chancellor stated that Britain and France cannot just send troops to Ukraine "This whole process cannot happen without Russia's consent" So far, only Macron and Starmer have expressed readiness to send so-called peacekeepers post-war Yet, the scale is much smaller than earlier speculation — a maximum of 7,500 soldiers from each countryx . This echoes earlier German reluctance; former Chancellor Olaf Scholz previously declared "NATO is not and will not be a party to the war. We do not want Russia's war against Ukraine to turn into a war between Russia and NATO"‼️There will be neither German military nor NATO troops in Ukraine - Scholz “NATO is not and will not be a party to the war. We do not want Russia’s war against Ukraine to turn into a war between Russia and NATO. I will not send soldiers of our armed forces to Ukraine,” Scholz said.x .
Macron acknowledged these divisions explicitly: "It is not unanimous. But we do not need unanimity to achieve it"Macron says European countries to deploy to Ukraine after peace dealrfi . This willingness to proceed without full consensus marks a significant departure from traditional NATO decision-making, where unanimity has been the norm for major strategic commitments.
Public opinion further complicates coalition sustainability. While 62% of Britons support sending peacekeepers to Ukraine, opposition runs high in continental Europe: 53% of Germans oppose deployment, and in France, only 33% support sending troops compared to 43% opposedFour years into the Ukraine war, where does Western European ...yougov +1. This creates a potential legitimacy crisis for leaders like Macron who have already promised deployment.
The credibility of any deployment depends on European military capacity—a domain where significant gaps persist. Analysis from the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel indicates that credible European deterrence without US support would require "a minimum of 1,400 tanks, 2,000 infantry fighting vehicles and 700 artillery pieces"—"more combat power than currently exists in the French, German, Italian and British land forces combined"Defending Europe without the US: first estimates of what is neededbruegel . This would necessitate approximately 50 new European brigades and 300,000 additional personnelDefending Europe without the US: first estimates of what is neededbruegel .
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned that anyone believing Europe can defend itself without the United States is "dreaming," emphasizing that European dependency extends beyond troop numbers to "high-end enablers—integrated command structures, wide-area intelligence and surveillance, strategic lift and logistics, missile defence, space-based early warning, and the nuclear umbrella"Europe, NATO, and the Limits of Strategic Autonomybehorizon .
The EU has responded with ambitious investment plans. The European Commission's White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 and ReArm Europe Plan envision unlocking more than €800 billion in defence investment[PDF] Military assistance to Ukraine: What has changed in 2025?parliament . Defence spending projections show a trajectory from €189 billion in 2014 to €381 billion in 2025, with estimates reaching €800 billion by 2030This sentiment is just delusional at this point. European defense spending has more than doubled between 2014 (€189bn) and 2025 (€381bn) and is projected to rise to €800bn in 2030. That is equivalent to $950bn, more than even the US is going to spend on its military in 2026. https://t.co/44fayDKvZ4x . The EU and member states have already provided €69.3 billion in military support to Ukraine, trained over 86,000 Ukrainian soldiers, and committed to supplying two million rounds of ammunition in 2025EU military & defence support to Ukraine | EEAS - European Unioneuropa .
However, operational shortfalls remain acute. One analysis notes that Europe "lacks the logistics, readiness, and force projection to sustain a major war especially without U.S. support," requiring "€250 billion/year and 300,000 more troops to build credible deterrence"—a process analysts estimate would take years"CAN EUROPE'S MILITARY GO ALONE AGAINST RUSSIA" While Russia leads in some ground force numbers, combined European NATO forces significantly outmatch Russia in total personnel, air power, and naval assets, possessing far more active soldiers, jets, and ships, though Russia is rapidly increasing tank and artillery production, making the combined EU/NATO's qualitative edge and sheer volume a formidable force. But......... The idea that Europe is ‘overwhelming’ militarily is misleading when you look beyond raw numbers. Europe has respectable forces but lacks the logistics, readiness, and force projection to sustain a major war especially without U.S. support. Europe could go alone against Russia, but it requires massive, immediate investment and overcoming decades of fragmented defense, needing €250 billion/year and 300,000 more troops to build credible deterrence, which analysts say takes years. While European forces are superior in quality and overall numbers, serious gaps exist in munitions, air defense, and rapid deployment, necessitating rapid production and integration to build self-sufficiency. European nations require time to enhance their military capabilities. The major issue is that time is running out......x .
Russian military doctrine explicitly identifies "deployment (build-up) of military contingents of foreign states (groups of states) in the territories of the states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies" as a main external military risk[PDF] THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATIONrusmilsec . The doctrine further lists the "use of military force in the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies in violation of the UN Charter" among actions constituting threats requiring response[PDF] THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATIONrusmilsec .
President Putin has been explicit about consequences: any troops deployed to Ukraine would become "legitimate targets" for Russian forcesUK should send non-combat troops to Ukraine now, former ... - BBCbbc +1. Former Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev articulated a zero-sum worldview where Russia "cannot tolerate the existence next to our country of a state that is hostile toward us"🇷🇺 MEDVEDEV'S CHILLING WARNING: "We Cannot Tolerate Unfriendly Neighbors" ‼️Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia's Security Council, has issued a blunt and expanding threat to all nations bordering the Russian Federation, directly tying the war in Ukraine to a broader imperial strategy. 🔍 Key Takeaways from the Statement: 🔻Zero Tolerance: Russia refuses to accept the existence of "unfriendly" neighboring states, especially those allied with or part of NATO. 🔻Systemic War: He explicitly stated that as long as unresolved territorial conflicts exist, the threat of war remains "systemic" and permanent. 🔻The Ultimate Goal: Medvedev openly admitted that the true purpose of the "Special Military Operation" is to permanently eliminate the military and sovereign capabilities of these neighboring states for the future. 💡 Why it matters (Zero-Click Context): This is a rare, unfiltered admission of Moscow's grand strategy. It confirms that the war is not just about the current regime in Kyiv, but about forcefully reshaping the geopolitical map, erasing independent foreign policies in the region, and sending a direct threat to any neighbor with a "territorial conflict" (such as Georgia or Moldova). 👇 Does this statement prove that Russia will never voluntarily stop at Ukraine, or is this just psychological warfare aimed at intimidating NATO? Let’s debate in the replies. ▶️ Follow for unfiltered geopolitical analysis: @TTheBattlefield #Russia #Medvedev #NATO #UkraineWar #Geopolitics #EasternEurope #Kremlin #BreakingNewsx .
Russia's Foreign Ministry declared "the absolute inadmissibility of deploying units of foreign armed forces in Ukraine under any flag whatsoever," warning that such forces "will be considered legitimate military targets"Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, Moscow, July 17, 2025globalsecurity . This creates a direct collision course between European security guarantees and Russian red lines.
Historical experience raises concerns about the durability of "non-combat" designations. Conservative MP Sir Edward Leigh warned Parliament as early as 2015: "The trouble with sending advisers, as the Americans found in Vietnam, and many other nations have found since, [is that] mission creep results in eventually combat troops being sent"UK considering further Ukraine help - Michael Fallon - BBC Newsbbc +1.
The Vietnam parallel is not merely rhetorical. Analysis from the Responsible Statecraft institute notes that "when the United States involves itself militarily in a conflict, it often finds it hard to get itself out, let alone avoid deep entanglements that blow well past lines it had drawn at the start of the intervention"Mission Creep? How the US role in Ukraine has slowly escalatedresponsiblestatecraft . Current and former intelligence officials reported that "there is a much larger presence of both CIA and US special operations personnel" in Ukraine than acknowledged, conducting "clandestine American operations" that "are now far more extensive"Mission Creep? How the US role in Ukraine has slowly escalatedresponsiblestatecraft .
A veteran US Army combat advisor who has trained over 5,000 Ukrainian soldiers across 22 brigades provided a stark battlefield assessment: "If NATO armies walked onto this battlefield tomorrow, using their current doctrine, they would not last 48 hours"@JPLindsley I retired from the U.S. Army after almost two decades in uniform, and for the last 3½ years I’ve been on Ukraine’s front as a volunteer combat advisor—training over 5,000 soldiers across 22 brigades. What we face here is a new reality. FPV strike drones and recon birds hunt positions all day. If you move, you’re seen, and within minutes artillery or a kamikaze UAS is on top of you. Shahed swarms crash into cities. Lancets hunt armor. FPVs chase individual soldiers down in trenches. Nothing is safe—armor, command posts, infrastructure, even civilians are targets. Survival comes down to concealment, constant movement, electronic discipline, and small-unit decision making. There is no time to wait for higher command—if a squad leader hesitates, his men die. Ukraine has had to innovate to survive: building drones in garages, creating cheap interceptors, rewriting tactics every month to keep pace with the battlefield. Meanwhile, the West still pours billions into Cold War doctrine—large formations, static positions, and the assumption of air superiority. Out here, none of that exists. If NATO armies walked onto this battlefield tomorrow, using their current doctrine, they would not last 48 hours. This war is the warning. Drone warfare is not the future—it’s the present. Every Western military should be flooding resources into attack drones, counter-UAS, electronic warfare, camouflage, and training for dispersed, drone-saturated combat. But they’re not. And the price of that delay will be paid later in blood. I’m not writing theory. I’m telling you what I live through every single day. Ukraine is holding the line, buying the world time. Either the West learns from this fight, or they walk blind into their own disaster. Slava Ukraini 🇺🇦x . The modern battlespace, dominated by FPV strike drones, reconnaissance assets, and precision artillery, has fundamentally altered conventional military assumptions.
The strategic logic underlying these proposals draws on Cold War deterrence concepts, particularly the idea of "tripwire forces" whose deaths would compel broader intervention. However, academic research challenges this foundation. A comprehensive analysis in Texas National Security Review concludes that "tripwire-force deployments are insufficient to bolster deterrence because deterrence is about more than signaling. One must instead deploy a force that is sufficiently capable—one that can itself fulfill a deterrent threat"The Truth About Tripwires: Why Small Force Deployments Do Not ...tnsr .
The Korean War offers a cautionary precedent. In 1949, Joseph Stalin vetoed a North Korean invasion because sizable US forces in South Korea would make rapid conquest unlikely. After American drawdown left only a tripwire force, Stalin became confident that "North Korean forces could achieve a rapid fait accompli, conquering the entire peninsula before a broader American intervention could occur"Death Without Deterrence, or Why Tripwire Forces Are Not Enough – War on the Rockswarontherocks . The prospect of American combat deaths did not deter Stalin; instead, upon receiving reports of casualties, "rather than recoiling in discouragement, Stalin pressed North Korea to conquer South Korea quickly before broader American reinforcements could arrive"Death Without Deterrence, or Why Tripwire Forces Are Not Enough – War on the Rockswarontherocks .
Survey experiments on tripwire effectiveness found results "inconsistent with Hypothesis 5. Attacks on the 'tripwire' deployment do not increase support for escalation compared to attacks on the non tripwire deployment"[PDF] Testing Tripwire Theory Using Survey Experiments - APSA Preprintsapsanet . This undermines the assumption that troop casualties would automatically generate irresistible domestic pressure for escalation.
A fundamental strategic ambiguity surrounds whether collective defence obligations would apply to NATO troops operating outside alliance territory. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty "imposes geographic limitations on the scope of NATO's mutual assistance obligation, primarily limiting it to the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer"Collective defence and Article 5nato . Forces deployed to Ukraine—a non-NATO country—would not automatically trigger Article 5 protections.
This creates what former Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhny characterized as a hollow commitment: "The Baltic states and Poland understand very well that there is no Article 5 in NATO and there never will be"The Baltic states and Poland understand very well that there is no Article 5 in NATO and there never will be - Zaluzhny The former commander of the Ukrainian armed forces also reported that he received a call from Romania and was asked not to mention that russian drones had fallen on Romanian territory. NATO continues to deny and conceal the russian threat.x . The explicit US position that Article 5 should not apply to European forces in Ukraine reinforces this vulnerability.
European leaders recognize this gap. Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo has stated that any peace deal "will not reduce the Russian threat" because "Russian forces will not demobilize. They will redeploy, most likely toward NATO's eastern flank"Europe is entering a post Pax Americana reality and rearming exclusively with European equipment Europe is shifting to a war footing. This week, the European Parliament approved fast track permitting rules for defense infrastructure, cutting approval timelines to 50 working days. The objective is explicit. Unlock up to €800 billion in defense investment over the coming years under the ReArm Europe Plan. Speed now matters as much as scale. Finland’s prime minister Petteri Orpo has been equally direct. Any peace deal in Ukraine will not reduce the Russian threat. Russian forces will not demobilize. They will redeploy, most likely toward NATO’s eastern flank. Europe’s frontline states understand this instinctively. Geography has a way of clarifying strategy. In parallel, the European Commission’s Defense Readiness Roadmap 2030 sets out a fundamental expansion of capability. Drone defense. A continent wide air shield. Defense production rising from roughly €100 billion today to €335 billion annually by the end of the decade. This is reindustrialization of European power. Most of this buildup will be European. The United States can no longer be treated as a reliable anchor for Europe’s security. Donald Trump and the MAGA movement openly undermine NATO, block support for Ukraine, and increasingly echo Russian positions. Europe now plans on the assumption that American backing may disappear without warning. That assumption changes everything. Procurement. Supply chains. Strategic posture. Europe is rearming with European equipment because it has learned the hard lesson that dependency is a weakness and loyalty cannot be outsourced. As Merz put it plainly, Pax Americana no longer applies to Europe. This is what a continent waking up looks like. Money allocated. Factories expanded. Timelines enforced. Not trust in distant allies, but resilience built at home. Europe is not preparing for war because it seeks conflict. It is preparing because clarity has finally replaced denial. And in that clarity lies something new for Europe. Not fear, but agency.x . Without a credible US commitment to respond to attacks on European forces, the deterrent value of any deployment remains questionable.
The historical record of peacekeeping in contested environments offers mixed guidance. UN peacekeeping doctrine traditionally required consent of all parties: "The UN Peacekeeping Forces may only be employed when both parties to a conflict accept their presence"United Nations Peacekeeping Forces – Historynobelprize . The proposed Ukrainian deployment would lack Russian consent, creating fundamental operational and legal complications.
The UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) demonstrates the hazards of peacekeeping without adequate mandate or resources. Despite its mission to maintain peace, "UNPROFOR struggled to curb widespread atrocities and ethnic violence during the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s"Assessing Past UN Peacekeeping: Lessons for Future Missionstrendsresearch . Its "limited mandate, initially unclear strategy, and insufficient resources—including troop numbers, equipment, and logistical support—hampered its ability to effectively monitor and control violence across extensive territories"Assessing Past UN Peacekeeping: Lessons for Future Missionstrendsresearch . The failure to prevent the Srebrenica genocide remains a defining lesson about the consequences of underresourced peacekeeping in active conflict zones.
More recent peacekeeping has evolved toward "stabilization missions" that acknowledge the absence of peace to keep. By the 2010s, UN operations in Congo, Mali, and the Central African Republic were explicitly designated stabilization rather than peacekeeping missionsUnderstanding Peacekeepingyoutube . African-led operations have demonstrated greater willingness to undertake combat mandates, but these typically involve regional actors with direct stakes in outcomesThe changing face of peacekeeping: What's gone wrong with the UN?thenewhumanitarian .
The advocacy for UK troop deployments to Ukraine represents both an evolution in European strategic thinking and a potential inflection point in transatlantic relations. Several key dynamics emerge:
NATO Fragmentation: The coalition of the willing operates explicitly outside NATO structures, creating a two-tier European security architecture. This may enhance flexibility but risks undermining the institutional foundations of collective defence. The explicit US refusal to extend Article 5 coverage forces European allies to accept unprecedented risk without the nuclear umbrella that has underpinned deterrence for seven decades.
Capability-Credibility Mismatch: European forces lack the independent capability to conduct sustained operations against a major power adversary. Without US intelligence, logistics, and strategic enablers, any deployment would depend on capabilities that current European defence planning cannot deliver before 2030 at the earliest. The €800 billion investment trajectory represents an acknowledgment of this gap rather than its resolution.
Escalation Pathways: The combination of Russian doctrinal red lines, explicit threats against foreign forces, and the erosion of the "non-combat" distinction through historical mission creep creates multiple escalation pathways. The absence of a US security guarantee removes the traditional deterrent against Russian escalation while placing European forces in exposed positions.
Domestic Political Sustainability: The divergence between British public support for deployment and continental European opposition creates coalition fragility. Leaders who commit forces without popular backing risk political backlash that could undermine long-term commitment—precisely the vulnerability Russia might exploit.
The fundamental strategic question remains unresolved: whether European forces can provide meaningful security guarantees to Ukraine without the American backing that both deterrence theory and operational reality suggest is essential. Boris Johnson's assertion that deployment would "flip a switch" in Putin's calculations assumes a psychological effect that academic research on tripwire forces does not supportThe Truth About Tripwires: Why Small Force Deployments Do Not ...tnsr . The alternative risk—that deployment creates targets rather than deterrents—cannot be dismissed.
The proposals reflect a Europe grappling with the end of assumptions that defined post-Cold War security: American primacy, Russian integration, and the obsolescence of great power conflict on European soil. Whether this moment produces genuine strategic autonomy or reveals the limits of European power projection absent transatlantic solidarity remains the defining question for continental security.